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I. INTRODUCTION

In United States v. Windsor' and Hollingsworth v. Perry,2 the
Roberts Court issued two decisions in the area of same-sex marriage
that clearly favored pro-lesbian, gay, bi-sexual, or transgendered
(LGBT) plaintiffs, who challenged the constitutionality of Section 3 of
the federal Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA) and California's
Proposition 8 ballot initiative, respectively. 3 Both decisions were hailed
in the liberal media as major advances for LGBT rights, while the
reaction from conservatives was altogether muted, if not supportive. For
example, Adam Liptak of the New York Times lauded the decision as "a
pair of major victories for the gay rights movement," while the
*
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kindness and support. Professor Faizer would also like to thank the Duncan School of Law
Technical Services and Circulation Librarian, Ann W. Long, and the University of Florida
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publication.
1. United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013); United States v. Windsor (Windsor
I), 699 F.3d 169 (2d Cir. 2012), cert. granted, 133 S. Ct. 786 (Dec. 7, 2012).
2. Defense of Marriage Act, Pub. L. No. 104-199, 110 Stat. 2419 (1996) (codified as I
U.S.C. § 7).
3. Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S. Ct. 2652 (2013).
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conservative public intellectual and Washington Post columnist, George
F. Will, said "quite literally, the opposition to gay marriage is dying
out." 4 Although the immediate judicial outcome of the Court's decisions
in Windsor and Hollingsworth favored LGBT rights, the Court's
decisions should not solely be evaluated according to their apparent
desirability. Instead, these decisions should also be evaluated according
to their institutional legitimacy, their jurisprudence soundness, and
finally, the manner in which these decisions will affect and interact with
both U.S. government and society. When evaluated in this manner, the
Court's decisions are a problematic use of judicial review because they
risk precipitating a backlash against LGBT rights and further limiting
access to courts in a country with pronounced socio-economic
cleavages. In short, the decisions exacerbate, rather than bridge, the
nation's divides.
II. WINDSOR'S TENUOUS LOGIC WILL REQUIRE A PROBLEMATIC
REVERSAL OF MARRIAGE LAWS NATIONWIDE

In Windsor, the Roberts Court issued a decision on the
constitutionality of a DOMA provision that ostensibly has no direct
effect on states that limit marriage to opposite-sex couples. However,
the decision's tenuous logic will most likely mandate same-sex
marriage nationwide.
Windsor involved a constitutional challenge to DOMA's Section 3,
which denied federal marriage and survivor benefits to married samesex couples because it defined marriage as solely between opposite-sex
couples.5 The plaintiff Edith Windsor, a New York resident whose same
sex marriage was legal under New York law, brought suit seeking a
refund of $363,053 in federal estate taxes paid by her deceased spouse's
estate because DOMA denied marital estate tax exemptions to surviving
same sex spouses.6 The U.S. Attorney General, Eric Holder, sided with
the plaintiff and advised the lower court that the United States believed
the law to be unconstitutional and would not defend the law in court.7
The law was accordingly defended by the House of Representatives'
Bipartisan Legal Advisory Group (BLAG). Windsor's summary
4. Adam Liptak, Supreme Court Bolsters Gay Marriagewith Two Major Rulings, N.Y.
TIMES, June 26, 2013, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2013/06/27/us/politics/supremecourt-gay-marriage.html?pagewanted=all& r-0; George Will, Quite Literally, The Opposition
to Gay Marriage is Dying, ABCNEWS.COM (Dec. 9, 2012), http://abcnews.go.com/blogs/
politics/2012/12/george-will-quite-literally-the-opposition-to-gay-marriage-is-dying.
5. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2683.
6. Id.
7. Id. at 2683-84.
8. Id.
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judgment motion was granted by the U.S. District Court for the
Southern District of New York and affirmed by the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit. 9 On December 7, 2012, the U.S.
Supreme Court granted the U.S. Justice Department's petition for a writ
of certiorari.' 0 Oral argument was heard on March 27, 2013."
Justice Kennedy's majority opinion affirmed the lower courts and
concluded that DOMA's Section 3 was unconstitutional because it
denied federal benefits to same-sex couples who were married and
living in states where gay marriage was legal.12 The Court in effect
concluded that in providing federal marriage benefits, the federal
government must "piggy back" on a state's marriage definition.' 3
This holding would be coherent if it were based on the U.S.
Constitution's Tenth Amendment, which confirms that states have
residual police powers in our federalist system of government and that
"the several States," not the federal government, have the authority to
define marriage.14 The Court, however, did not do so, potentially
because the liberal justices who joined Justice Kennedy's decision are,
for historical reasons, loath to jurisprudentially expand the Tenth
Amendment's scope.' 5 The Court instead concluded that DOMA's
Section 3 was unconstitutional because it violated the Fifth
Amendment's Due Process Clause, which requires, among other things,
that the federal government grant all Americans the equal protection of
the law.16 Justice Kennedy writes:
The class to which DOMA directs its restrictions and restraints
are those persons who are joined in same-sex marriages made
lawful by the State. DOMA singles out a class of persons deemed
by a State entitled to recognition and protection to enhance their
own liberty. It imposes a disability on the class by refusing to
acknowledge a status the State finds to be dignified and proper.
DOMA instructs all federal officials, and indeed all persons with
whom same-sex couples interact, including their own children,
that their marriage is less worthy than the marriages of others.
The federal statute is invalid, for no legitimate purpose
overcomes the purpose and effect to disparage and to injure those
9. Windsor I, 699 F.3d 169 (2d Cir. 2012), cert. granted, 133 S. Ct. 786 (Dec. 7, 2012).
10. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 696.
11. Windsor 1,699 F.3d at 169.
12. See Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675.
13. Id. at 2681.
14. U.S. CONST. amend. X. The Tenth Amendment provides, "[t]he powers not delegated
to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the
States respectively, or to the people."
15. Id
16. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2695-96.
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whom the State, by its marriage laws, sought to protect in
personhood and dignity. By seeking to displace this protection
and treating those persons as living in marriages less respected
than others, the federal statute is in violation of the Fifth
Amendment. This opinion and its holding are confined to those
lawful marriages.17
This rationale is contradictory. How is the federal government's duty
to recognize same-sex marriages limited only to couples who were both
married and are currently living in states that have legalized same-sex
marriage? Would the equal protection rationale not require the federal
government to recognize same-sex marriages entered into in states
where same-sex marriage is legal that have since relocated to states
where it is illegal? What about same-sex couples that want to marry in
states where same-sex marriage is illegal?
Washington Post columnist and public intellectual Charles
Krauthammer, noting this contradiction, writes:
Why should equal protection apply only in states that recognize
gay marriage? Why doesn't it apply equally - indeed, even
perhaps more forcefully - to gays who want to marry in states
that refuse to marry them? If discriminating (regarding federal
benefits) between a gay couple and a straight couple is prohibited
in New York where gay marriage is legal, by what logic is
discrimination permitted in Texas, where a gay couple is
preventedfrom marrying in thefirstplace?i8
While the Court's holding might make sense if it were based on the
Tenth Amendment, its reliance on equal protection strengthens the
argument of those like Justice Scalia who in dissent, sets forth the
decision as an illogical judicial diktat:',
It takes real cheek for today's majority to assure us, as it is going
out the door, that a constitutional requirement to give formal
recognition to same-sex marriage is not at issue here-when what
has preceded that assurance is a lecture on how superior the
majority's moral judgment in favor of same-sex marriage is to the
Congress's hateful moral judgment against it. I promise you this:
The only thing that will "confine" the Court's holding is its sense
17.
18.

Id. (emphasis added).
Charles Krauthammer, Nationalized Gay Marriage, Now Inevitable, WASH. POST,
June 27, 2013, http://www.washingtonpost.com/2013-06-27/opinions/40233030_1gaymarriage-state-abortion-law-doma (emphasis added).
19. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2709 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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of what it can get away with.20
Justice Scalia argues that the decision's logic means nothing less
than the eventual reversal of all laws limiting marriage to opposite-sex
couples. 2 1 Indeed, he states the Court would have been more honest if it
had explicitly done so. He writes:
Some will rejoice in today's decision, and some will despair at it;
that is the nature of a controversy that matters so much to so
many. But the Court has cheated both sides, robbing the winners
of an honest victory, and the losers of the peace that comes from
a fair defeat. We owed both of them better. I dissent.2 2
The Windsor majority invalidated DOMA's Section 3 in an apparent
nod towards federalist principles. The problem is that the Court did so
by way of the Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause and therefore
made the decision jurisprudentially unsound and underinclusive. Justice
Scalia is indeed correct that the Windsor holding is destabilized by a
volatile equal protection rationale that could undermine the legality of
state marriage laws nationwide.
By way of example, Windsor did not adjudicate the constitutionality
of DOMA's Section 2, which provides that no jurisdiction need
recognize a same-sex marriage entered into in another state that has
legalized these marriages.23 However, section 2's constitutionality is
rendered untenable by Windsor. On July 22, 2013, the United States
District Court for the Southern District of Ohio used the Court's equal
protection rationale in Windsor to enjoin application of a provision in
Ohio's marriage law that refuses to recognize same-sex marriages
entered into in states that permit these marriages. 24 Should this decision
be affirmed by the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals, same-sex marriage
will, by way of the federal courts, be constitutionally mandated in the
conservative states that comprise the Sixth Circuit because of the U.S.
Constitution's Supremacy Clause. 2 5 Since the Windsor decision as
20. Id.
21. Id. at 2710.
22. Id. at 2711.
23. Id.
24. See Obergefell v. Kasich, No. 1:13-cv-501, slip op. at 2013 WL 3814262 (S.D. Ohio
July 22, 2013).
25. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in
Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the
Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the
Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, Thing in the Constitution or Laws
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promulgated, federal district courts in Ohio, Virginia, Utah, Oklahoma,
Texas, Kentucky, and Tennessee have all cited Windsor's equal
protection rationale to invalidate or adumbrate the invalidation of these
states' opposite-sex only marriage laws. 26
Is this a good result? Not necessarily. As set forth above, George F.
Will has said, opposition to same-sex marriage, is, for demographic
reasons, literally "dying out." 27 The former New York Times blogger,
Nate Silver, has used the trajectory of public opinion polls to estimate
that voters in 44 states will be in support of gay marriage by the year
2020.28 The risk is the reasoning used in the Court's decision to
invalidate DOMA's Section 3 will lead to a judicially-mandated result
that prompts a harmful backlash against same-sex couples and LGBT
rights. 29 Justice Ginsberg, leader of the Court's liberal block of justices,
made this argument with respect to abortion rights when she said the
Court prematurely politicized the issue by nationalizing a woman's
individual right to abort her pregnancy in Roe v. Wade,30
notwithstandinq the fact that states had begun to liberalize their
abortion laws. 1 The Court's inconsistent use of equal protection
jurisprudence to invalidate DOMA's Section 3 will hopefully not
redound to the detriment of those whose rights the decision seeks to

advance. 32
The Court's Windsor decision was lauded because it resulted in the
invalidation of a key provision of an altogether execrable piece of
federal legislation.3 3 Had the Court invalidated DOMA's Section 3 on
of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding.
Id.
26. Ogerbefell v. WYMYSLO, 962 F. Supp. 2d 968 (S.D. Ohio 2013); Griego v. Oliver,
316 P.3d 865 (N.M. 2013); Bostic v. Rainey, 2014 WL 561978 (E.D. Va. 2014); Kitchen v.
Herbert, 961 F. Supp. 2d 1181 (D. Utah 2013); Bishop v. United States ex rel. Holder, 962 F.
Supp. 2d 1252 (N.D. Okla. 2014); De Leon v. Perry, 2014 WL 715741 (W.D. Tex. 2014);
Bourke v. Beshear, 2014 WL 556729 (W.D. Ky. 2014); Tanco v. Haslam, 2014 WL 997525
(M.D. Tenn. 2014). Similarly, state courts have invalidated state opposite-sex only marriage
laws in New Jersey and New Mexico. Garden State Equal. v. Dow (N.J. Sup. Ct. 2013); Griego
v. Oliver, 316 P.3d 865 (N.M. 2013).
27. Rebecca Shapiro, George Will: "Quite Literally, The Opposition to Gay Marriageis
Dying" (VIDEO), HUFFINGTON POST (Dec. 9,2012, 12:07 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/
2012/12/09/george-will-opposition-gay-marriage-dying_n 2267475.html?.
28. Nate Silver, How Opinion on Same-Sex Marriage is Changing,and What it Means,
N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 26, 2013, 10:10 AM), http://fivethirty eight.blogs.nytimes.com/2013/03/26/
how-opinion-on-same-sex-marriage-is-changing-and-what-it-means/.
29. See Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2675.
30. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
31. Lincoln Caplan, Ginsburg'sRoe v. Wade Blind Spot, NYTIMES.COM (May 13, 2013,
2:58 PM), http://takingnote.blogs.nytimes.com/2013/05/13/ginsburgs-roe-v-wade-blindspot.
32. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2705-06 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
33. Id. at 2695.
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Federalist principles confirmed by the Tenth Amendment, the decision
would have consistently and effectively limited its holding only to
states that have legalized same-sex marriage. The Court's failure to do
so and use of the equal protection rationale to invalidate the law instead
will most likely result in the invalidation of all state laws and state
constitutional amendments that limit marriage to opposite-sex couples.
This result will needlessly further politicize the issue of same-sex
marriage and further delegitimize the Court among many conservatives
and individuals who espouse a traditional view of marriage. Even from
the perspective of an LGBT rights advocate, this is a parlous result
because nationwide public opinion is moving strongly toward
recognition of same-sex marriage rights. The Court's intervention into
the same-sex marriage debate jeopardizes the progress made toward
LGBT rights by risking such a backlash. Windsor, in short, was an illtimed and poorly-reasoned application of the Court's judicial review
power.

III. THE COURT'S DECISION IN HOLLINGSWORTH

WILL IMPROPERLY
LIMIT COURT ACCESS FOR MANY AMERICANS

Hollingsworthv. Perry involved the constitutionality of California's
ballot initiative 34 known as Proposition 8, which in 2008 amended the
California Constitution to prohibit same-sex marriages. 3 5 The ballot
initiative passed by a 52%-48% margin and followed a California
Supreme Court decision that concluded that California's previous
marriage law, which limited marriage to opposite-sex couples, violated
the Equal Protection Clause of the California Constitution.
Respondents, two same-sex couples, brought suit in the U.S. District
Court for the Northern District of California against the Governor,
Attorney General, and other California marriage-enforcing officials
challenging the constitutionality of Proposition 8 under the Fourteenth
Amendment's Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses. 37 The named
defendants refused to defend the law and the District Court allowed the
Petitioners, the proposition's official proponents, to defend the law in
federal court. 38 The District Court concluded Proposition 8 violated the
34. Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S. Ct. 2652 (2013).
35. CAL. CONST. art. I, § 7.5 (defining Proposition 8 as "[o]nly marriage between a man
and a woman is valid or recognized in California.").
36. See In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384, 453 (Cal. 2008); see also CaliforniaResults,
L.A. TIMES, http://www.latirmes.com/news/local/la-2008election-california-results,0,3304898.
htmlstory (last visited Oct. 12, 2013).
37. Hollingsworth, 133 S. Ct. at 2660.
38. Id.
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U.S. Constitution and the defendants chose not to appeal the decision to
the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. 39 The Ninth Circuit certified a
question to the California Supreme Court as to whether petitioners, as
proponents of Proposition 8, had standing under California law to
appeal the lower court's decision.40 After the California Supreme Court
concluded that petitioners had standing under California law, the Ninth
Circuit concluded that petitioners had standing under Article III of the
U.S. Constitution to defend Proposition 8 because California, as an
independent sovereign, can determine who defends its laws.41 The Ninth
Circuit writes: "All a federal court need determine is that the state has
suffered a harm sufficient to confer standing and that the party seeking
to invoke the jurisdiction of the court is authorized by the state to
represent its interest in remedying that harm." 4 2
With regard to the case's substantive component, the Ninth Circuit,
relying on Romer v. Evans,4 3 affirmed the district court, which
concluded the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause
required a state to have a legitimate public policy reason to withdraw a
right from a group within its population.4 4 Because the California
Supreme Court's decision of 2008 gave same-sex couples the right to
marry in California for a limited time until Proposition 8 went into
effect, the lower courts interpreted Proposition 8 as a state constitutional
amendment that illegally took a right away from same-sex couples,
while not affecting opposite-sex couples.4 5 The Ninth Circuit, affirming
the district court, writes:
taking away the official designation of "marriage" from same-sex
couples, while continuing to afford those couples all the rights
and obligations of marriage, did not further any legitimate
interest of the State. Proposition 8, in the court's view, violated
the Equal Protection Clause because it served no purpose "but to
impose on gays and lesbians, through the public law, a majority's
private disapproval of them and their relationships.4 6
Certiorari was granted by the U.S. Supreme Court and the parties
were asked whether Petitioners had standing to appeal the district
39.
40.
(9th Cir.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.

Id.
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Perry v. Brown, 671 F.3d 1052, 1072
2012)).
Id.
Id.
Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996).
Hollingsworth, 133 S. Ct. at 2660-61.
Perry,671 F.3d at 1096; Hollingsworth, 133 S. Ct. at 2661.
Hollingsworth, 133 S. Ct. at 2661 (quoting Perry,671 F3d at 1095-96).
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court's decision and order in Respondents' favor. 4 7
Chief Justice Roberts' majority decision did not consider any of the
case's substantive legal issues.48 Rather, he seized upon an ostensible
textual limitation imposed upon federal courts to hear cases and dismiss
them on standing grounds. The U.S. Constitution, Article III, § 2
provides, in relevant part, that the Court's "Judicial Power shall extend
to all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under the Constitution . .. [and]

Controversies
writes:

[.]"49

Interpreting this provision, the Chief Justice

Article III of the Constitution confines the judicial power of
federal courts to deciding actual "Cases" or "Controversies." § 2.
One essential aspect of this requirement is that any person
invoking the power of a federal court must demonstrate standing
to do so. This requires the litigant to prove that he has suffered a
concrete and particularized injury that is fairly traceable to the
challenged conduct, and is likely to be redressed by a favorable
judicial decision.50
Applying this rule to Hollingsworth,he writes:
The only individuals who sought to appeal that order were
petitioners, who had intervened in the District Court. But the
District Court had not ordered them to do or refrain from doing
anything. To have standing, a litigant must seek relief for an
injury that affects him in a "personal and individual way." He
must possess a "direct stake in the outcome" of the case. Here,
however, petitioners had no "direct stake" in the outcome of their
appeal. Their only interest in having the District Court order
reversed was to vindicate the constitutional validity of a generally
applicable California law. 5
The Chief Justice concluded that Petitioners lacked standing under
Article III of the U.S. Constitution because they were in no worse
position than other citizens who opposed same-sex marriage and
therefore had no cognizable injury for standing purposes. 52 With regard
to the fact that California specifically allowed Petitioners, as
4 7.

Id.

48. Id. at 2661-63.
49. U.S. CONsT. art. III, § 2, cl. 1.
50. Hollingsworth, 133 S. Ct. at 2661 (citing Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S.
555, 560-61 (1992)).
51. Id. at 2662 (quoting Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560 n.1; Arizonians for Official English v.
Arizona, 520 U.S. 43, 64 (1997)).
52.

Id.
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Proposition 8's proponents, to appeal the district court's decision, the
Chief Justice writes:
Petitioners argue that, by virtue of the California Supreme
Court's decision, they are authorized "to act 'as agents of the
people' of California." But that Court never described petitioners
as "agents of the people," or of anyone else. Nor did the Ninth
Circuit. The Ninth Circuit asked-and the California Supreme
Court answered-only whether petitioners had "the authority to
assert the State's interest in the initiative's validity." All that the
California Supreme Court decision stands for is that, so far as
California is concerned, petitioners may argue in defense of
Proposition 8. This "does not mean that the proponents become
de facto public officials"; the authority they enjoy is "simply the
authority to participate as parties in a court action and to assert
legal arguments in defense of the state's interest in the validity of
the initiative measure." That interest is by definition a
generalized one, and it is precisely because proponents assert
such an interest that they lack standing under our precedents. 53
The Chief Justice set forth that because Petitioners neither answered
to nor had any ethical or fiduciary obligations to anyone, they could not
claim standing as the State of California's agents. 54 He writes: "We
have never before upheld the standing of a private party to defend the
constitutionality of a state statute when state officials have chosen not
to. We decline to do so for the first time here."5 5 He concludes:
Because petitioners have not satisfied their burden to demonstrate
standing to appeal the judgment of the District Court, the Ninth
Circuit was without jurisdiction to consider the appeal. The
judgment of the Ninth Circuit is vacated, and the case is
remanded with instructions to dismiss the appeal for lack of
jurisdiction.5 6
Is this the correct result? Justice Kennedy, whose dissent posits that
the Court should have taken consideration of California state law in its
standing determination, writes:
Under California law, a proponent has the authority to appear in
53. Id. at 2666 (citations omitted) (quoting Arizonians, 520 U.S. at 65; Perry v.
Schwartzenegger, 628 F.3d 1191, 1193 (9th Cir. 2011)).
54. Id. at 2667.
55. Id. at 2668.
56. Id.
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court and assert the State's interest in defending an enacted
initiative when the public officials charged with that duty refuse
to do so. The State deems such an appearance essential to the
integrity of its initiative process. Yet the Court today concludes
that this state-defined status and this state-conferred right fall
short of meeting federal requirements because the proponents
cannot point to a formal delegation of authority that tracks the
requirements of the Restatement of Agency. But the State
Supreme Court's definition of proponents' powers is binding on
this Court. And that definition is fully sufficient to establish the
standing and adversity that are requisites for justiciability under
Article III of the United States Constitution.5 7
According to Justice Kennedy, to focus on agency theory in order to
deny petitioners Article III standing is to completely disregard
California's voter initiative paradigm that is specifically designed to
remedy a situation where elected executive officials, for political
reasons, refuse to defend the constitutionality of state ballot initiatives
58
in court. Justice Kennedy writes:
In the end, what the Court fails to grasp or accept is the basic
premise of the initiative process. And it is this. The essence of
democracy is that the right to make law rests in the people and
flows to the government, not the other way around. Freedom
resides first in the people without need of a grant from
government. The California initiative process embodies these
principles and has done so for over a century. "Through the
structure of its government, and the character of those who
exercise government authority, a State defines itself as
sovereign." Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 460, 111 S.Ct.
2395, 115 L.Ed.2d 410 (1991). In California and the 26 other
States that permit initiatives and popular referendums, the people
have exercised their own inherent sovereign right to govern
themselves. The Court today frustrates that choice by nullifying,
for failure to comply with the Restatement of Agency, a State
Supreme Court decision holding that state law authorizes an
enacted initiative's proponents to defend the law if and when the
State's usual legal advocates decline to do so. The Court's
opinion fails to abide by precedent and misapplies basic
principles ofjusticiability. 59

57. Id. (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
58. Id.
59. Id. at 2675 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
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Justice Kennedy's dissent explains that this is especially so in
situations such as Hollingsworth, where the standing issue was
prompted by a federal court's decision to invalidate the law.60 He
writes:
There is much irony in the Court's approach to justiciability in
this case. A prime purpose of justiciability is to ensure vigorous
advocacy, yet the Court insists upon litigation conducted by state
officials whose preference is to lose the case. The doctrine is
meant to ensure that courts are responsible and constrained in
their power, but the Court's opinion today means that a single
district court can make a decision with far-reaching effects that
cannot be reviewed. And rather than honor the principle that
justiciability exists to allow disputes of public policy to be
resolved by the political process rather than the courts, here the
Court refuses to allow a State's authorized representatives to
defend the outcome of a democratic election.
The Court's opinion disrespects and disparages both the political
process in California and the well-stated opinion of the California
Supreme Court in this case. The California Supreme Court, not
this Court, expresses concern for vigorous representation; the
California Supreme Court, not this Court, recognizes the
necessity to avoid conflicts of interest; the California Supreme
Court, not this Court, comprehends the real interest at stake in
this litigation and identifies the most proper party to defend that
interest. The California Supreme Court's opinion reflects a better
understanding of the dynamics and principles of Article III than
does this Court's opinion.61
It is clear that Petitioners were damaged, for Article III purposes, by
the district court's ruling because, unlike other California citizens, they
played an altogether unique role in the ballot-initiative process. 62 Justice
Kennedy writes:
They know and understand the purpose and operation of the
proposed law, an important requisite in defending initiatives on
complex matters such as taxation and insurance. Having gone to
great lengths to convince voters to enact an initiative, they have a
stake in the outcome and the necessary commitment to provide

60.
61.
62.

Id. at 2674 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
Id.
Id. at 2669 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
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zealous advocacy. 63
The Chief Justice's decision was hailed by many on the liberal left
side of the political culture because it ensured that same-sex marriage
remained constitutionally mandated in California, which is the largest
and most economically important state in the United States, as measured
by population and economic output, respectively. 64 By dismissing the
case on standing grounds, however, the Chief Justice enabled the Court
to avoid adjudicating the constitutionality of state marriage laws that
limit marriage to opposite-sex couples. Perhaps his motivation in doing
so was to avoid having the Court wade into the issue of gay marriage
rights when the legality of gay marriage is front and center in the
political culture. This rationale, however, would have been satisfied by
a holding that certiorari was improvidently granted. Such a holding
would have left the Ninth Circuit's decision in place and signaled to
both the public and political cultures that the matter should not be
reviewed and instead left to the individual states. However, this
rationale was already upended by the flimsy logic used in Justice
Kennedy's decision in Windsor, which will likely result in judicially
mandated same-sex marriage nationwide. Moreover, this approach
would not have furthered the Chief Justice's standing-limiting
jurisprudence. Why might the Chief Justice have chosen to issue a
decision that denied Petitioners standing to appeal rather than hold that
certiorari was improvidently granted? Perhaps there was not a fifth vote
for the latter proposition. More likely, by issuing a decision that
substantially limited a litigant's standing to sue in federal court, the
Chief Justice furthered his jurisprudentially conservative goals.
Until Hollingsworth,the Court's standing-limiting jurisprudence was
65
best enunciated in Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife. Lujan was a public
interest suit brought by two plaintiffs who objected to a joint regulation
promulgated by the Secretaries of the Interior and Commerce. This
regulation limited, for agency funding purposes, the geographic scope
of the U.S. Endangered Species Act to the territorial United States and
the high seas. Plaintiffs' objection to U.S. agency funding for
international development projects, which would ostensibly have
harmful effects on adjacent wildlife and ecosystems, was dismissed for
lack of Article 1111 standing because plaintiffs were unable to allege the
following: (1) an actual or imminent concrete and particularized injury;
63.

Id

64. U.S. Department of Commerce, State and County Quickfacts, California, at
http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/06000.html; Government Revenue Details, California
State and Local Taxes for 2010, http://www.usgovernmentrevenue.com/California state
revenue 2010.
65. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (1992).
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(2) that is caused by the defendant's actions; and (3) will be redressed
by a favorable judicial outcome. Justice Scalia's opinion concluded they
lacked standing because they could neither demonstrate any injury
caused by the Agency regulation nor redressability should a court rule
in their favor.66
Justice Scalia focused on the fact that Article IlI requires federal
plaintiffs to demonstrate an injury to an individual right as opposed to a
public right that has been legislatively pronounced to apply to all
members of the public. 6 7 The governing law with respect to Article III
standing, however, was enunciated in Justice Kennedy's concurring
opinion, which concluded that the two public interest plaintiffs might
have been able to demonstrate an injury-in-fact if they had already made
definite plans to visit the affected international areas. 68 As such,
although the Lujan case greatly circumscribed a public interest
plaintiffs right to sue in federal court, Justice Kennedy's concurring
opinion left an open window for public interest plaintiffs by concluding
that procedural devices, such as the purchase of an airline ticket to visit
a threatened ecosystem, may confer sufficient injury upon a public
interest plaintiff for Article III standing purposes. 69
Needless to say, the Chief Justice's decision in Hollingsworth has,
going forward, shut this procedural window. Fortuitously for him, this
allowed the Court to avoid adjudicating the politically divisive issue of
state marriage laws while furthering his jurisprudentially conservative
goals. Why would limiting Article III standing be conservative? The
prominent author and legal analyst, Jeffrey Toobin, writes that the Chief
Justice "had spent decades thinking about how to throw plaintiffs in
civil cases out of court-the faster, the better. Civil procedure, so dreary
even to most lawyers, was for [current Chief Justice] Roberts the surest
route to victory for his political side." 7 0 The reason imposing procedural
roadblocks has a conservative bias is the economics of U.S. civil
jurisprudence. Toobin writes:
The real-world implications of these procedural roadblocks were
clear. With so many barriers at every stage of the process,
plaintiffs' lawyers hesitated before filing new cases, or did not
bring them at all. The costs and risks were too high, [Legislative
efforts at tort reform, like limits on punitive damages,
compounded the difficulties for plaintiffs]. If claims could never
66.
67.
68.

Id. at 558-61; 563-78; see also 16 U.S.C.
Id. at 577-78.
Id. at 579 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
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69. Id.
70. JEFFREY TOOBIN, THE OATH: THE OBAMA WHITE HOUSE AND THE SUPREME COURT 74
(2012).

20131 EXACERBA TING THE DIVIDE: WHY THE ROBERTS COURT'S RECENTSAME-SEX JURISPRUDENCE

409

get to trial because of procedural barriers, there would be fewer
cases brought in the first place. This was especially true in civil
rights cases-in "public law" cases, in [Harvard Law School
Professor Abram] Chayes's phrase-because these ambitious
undertakings had the greatest procedural vulnerabilities. The
defense bar understood these economic realities and, with a
sympathetic judiciary, pushed to capitalize on its advantages. As
a lawyer and)Iudge, Roberts was more skilled at this kind of work
than anyone.
In National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius,72 the
Chief Justice obtained the liberal segment of the political culture's
acquiescence in a decision that greatly narrowed the scope of
congressional legislative power under the Commerce Clause. He was
able to do so because his decision allowed the Patient Protection and
Affordable Care Act to survive judicial review. He similarly obtained
this same constituency's support for a decision that will make it more
difficult for individual plaintiffs to access federal courts because his
decision resulted in a constitutional-mandate for same-sex marriage in
the nation's most populous state.
This is a problematic result for a country that suffers from a very
weak economy in which low labor productivity growth, staggeringly
high levels of income and wealth inequality, stagnant middle class and
working class wages, low labor force participation rates, and chronically
high unemployment have become the new normal.7 3 Poorer Americans
and visible minorities have historically been able to access the courts by
way of trial lawyers who accept representation on a contingency fee
basis. Such representation will, most likely, be less forthcoming if
courts, based on the Chief Justice's decision, become more inclined to
dismiss cases on technical grounds. The regressive nature of standinglimiting jurisprudence was demonstrated in Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire
& Rubber Co., Inc., 74 where the Roberts Court dismissed, on standing
grounds, the plaintiffs sex discrimination claim against her employer
because the alleged discriminatory pay decisions made by the company
were beyond the 180-day limitation period of Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964." Justice Alito's decision concluded that Ledbetter
71. Id.
72. Nat'l Fed'n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012).
73. CIA World Factbook Website, at https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-worldfactbook/; David Leonhardt & Kevin Quealy, The American Middle Class is no Longer the
at http://www.nytimes.com/
(Apr. 22, 2014),
World's Richest, NYTIMES.COM
2014/04/23/upshot/the-american-middle-class-is-no-longer-the-worlds-richest.html? r-0.
74. Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., Inc., 550 U.S. 618 (2007).
75. Id. at 621-23.
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untimely filed suit with the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission (EEOC) even though she never knew of her unequal pay
treatment at the time the limitation period had elapsed.7 6 Based largely
on a dissent by Justice Ginsburg, which was unusually read from the
bench, Congress enacted the first piece of legislation signed into law by
President Obama, the Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act of 2009, which
revised the civil rights law to read that if a present act of discriminatory
pay is related to discrimination that took place outside the 180-day
limitation period, the prior act can be incorporated into the claim.
Needless to say, congressional interventions of this type are highly
atypical and implausible in the divided government paradigm that
characterizes today's Washington. Toobin writes:
The Ledbetter case reflected the practical impediments to
plaintiffs in civil rights cases. She initiated the case in 1998, and
the Supreme Court decided it nine years later. As with most
plaintiffs, her lawyers worked for a contingency fee, which meant
they earned nothing on the case for nearly a decade (or, as it
turned out, ever). Not many lawyers are willing to take such
risks. Indeed, Ledbetter's case only reached the Supreme Court
because after her loss in the Eleventh Circuit, her original
lawyers brought the case to the Supreme Court Litigation Clinic
at Stanford Law School. There the teachers and students agreed
to represent Ledbetter for free.
Using the standing doctrine and other technicalities to dispose of
cases in a manner favorable to corporate interests is clearly in line with
the Chief Justice's conservative jurisprudence and politics. Is this in the
country's best interest? Conservatives such as the academic historian
Niall Ferguson posit that the United States suffers from too much
regulation and litigiousness, which hinders U.S. competitiveness. 79 With
that said, it is liberals who have lauded the Chief Justice's decision that
will make the legal system less accessible to individual Americans and
provide federal courts with fewer opportunities to enforce rights and
entitlements related to employment and public policy. This is a
problematic result for a country that prides itself on being governed by
the rule of law.

76. Id. at 621.
77. Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act of 2009, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (2012).
78. TOOBIN, supra note 70, at 76.
79. Niall Ferguson, How America Lost Its Way, WALL ST. J. (June 7, 2013, 7:02 PM),
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB 10001424127887324798904578527552326836118.html.
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IV. CONCLUSION

The Roberts Court's recent jurisprudence in the area of gay marriage
evidences a self-contradictory libertarian, federalist, and conservative
jurisprudence that will most likely be harmful to U.S. society. The
Windsor and Hollingsworth decisions were very popular with liberal
pundits because they resulted in the invalidation of DOMA's Section 3
and created a constitutional-mandate for same-sex marriage in the
nation's most populous and economically most important state. For
example, in the August 2013 issue of New York Review of Books, David
Cole writes:
Together, these decisions are a consummate act of judicial
statesmanship. They extend federal benefits to all same-sex
married couples in states that recognize gay marriage, expand the
number of states recognizing gay marriage to thirteen, yet leave
open for the time being the ultimate issue of state power to limit
marriage to the union of a man and woman. The Court took a
significant step toward recognition of the equality rights of gays
and lesbians. But by not imposing same-sex marriage on the three
quarters of the states whose laws still forbid it, the Court has
allowed the issue to develop further through the political
process-where its trajectory is all but inevitable.80
In Windsor, however, the Court's failure to base its invalidation of
DOMA's Section 3 on Federalist principles alone and instead rely on a
self-contradictory application of the equal protection component of the
Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause, will, notwithstanding the fact
that the vast majority of U.S. states are currently in the process of
legislatively liberalizing their marriage laws, most likely lead to
judicially-mandated same sex marriage nationwide. This risks causing a
backlash against LGBT rights among traumatized citizens who are
prone to be exploited by demagogues in a politically divisive
environment that is coping with the effects of two failed wars and a
parlous economy.
In Hollingsworth, the Chief Justice's decision resulted in a
constitutional-mandate for same-sex marriage in the nation's most
populous and politically important state. However, his narrow
interpretation of Article III standing that led to the case's dismissal will
render the U.S. legal system even less accessible to the majority of
Americans. This is a problematic result for a country with an atypically
80. David Cole, Equality and the Roberts Court: Four Decisions, N.Y. REV. BOOKS
(Aug. 15, 2013), http://www.nybooks.com/articles/archives/2013/aug/15/equality-and-robertscourt-four-decisions.
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weak social safety net that has historically used the legal process as a
means of advancing the rights of marginalized and oppressed groups.
Although the Chief Justice's standing-limiting jurisprudence is
defensible from a conservative perspective, it is liberals and not
conservatives who have lauded his Hollingsworthdecision.
The Court's jurisprudence should be evaluated not only based on its
decisional outcomes, but also the institutional legitimacy of these
outcomes, the legal soundness of its jurisprudence, and finally, the
manner in which these decisions affect and interact with U.S.
government and society. By this measure, although the outcomes of the
Court's recent decisions involving same-sex marriage pleased segments
of the U.S. political and media culture, the Court's jurisprudence is
wanting in the areas of institutional legitimacy, legal soundness, and the
manner in which the decisions affect U.S. government and society.
Asking the Roberts Court to jurisprudentially remedy a continent-sized
super power's problems is certainly asking too much for the one
unelected branch of the U.S. government. That said, the Court can
certainly be judged according to the Latin medical phrase "primum non
nocere," meaning "first, do no harm." The harm is evidenced by the
Roberts Court's recent jurisprudence in the area of same sex marriage,
which may well exacerbate, rather than bridge, the country's numerous
divides.

